Noncognitivism in Ethics

According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is expressing our feelings about stealing, rather than stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. Their leading exponents range from A.J. Ayer to Simon Blackburn and Alan Gibbard. Noncognitivism in Ethics is an outstanding introduction to these theories, ranging from their early history through to the latest contemporary developments. Beginning with a general introduction to metaethics, Mark Schroeder escorts the reader through a tour of both the philosophical problems which noncognitivism seeks to solve and the deep problems that it faces, such as prescriptivism, the 'Frege-Geach' problem, expressivism, and relativism. Schroeder makes even the most difficult material accessible by offering crucial background along the way. Also included are exercises at the end of each chapter, chapter summaries, and a glossary of technical terms, making Noncognitivism in Ethics essential reading for all students of ethics and metaethics.