Adhesion Warfare : US Army Combat Forces Face an Enemy Who Is Capable of Negating Their Doctrinal Stand-Off Firepower Advantage in Afghan

Beginning in the Korea War, through Vietnam and continuing with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, US forces have been involved in combat typified by close, sharp actions - often without the doctrinally prescribed firepower to support the maneuver forces. US Operations in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan, in particular, dramatically demonstrate how an adept enemy, the Taliban, place themselves in very "close proximity" to friendly forces and civilian population and as a result, they are able to negate the US firepower advantage, thus removing the ability of US forces to use lethal fires from aircraft and artillery for fear of friendly or collateral damage. The lack of developed road networks and low US troop numbers prevented US forces from massing quickly in large numbers and led to a reliance on stand-off based firepower to support the maneuver forces. The indications point to a coordinated effort by enemy forces utilizing past performances of US enemies as a basis for their tactical evolution. Though not new to warfare, these adhesion warfare tactics present a significant problem for US ground forces that must increasingly rely on maneuver to defeat our enemies in the localized, direct action combat involved in counter-insurgency and low-level military action.