From Axis Victories to the Turn of the Tide : World War II, 1939-1943

From Axis Victories to the Turn of the Tide is a history of the critical campaigns of World War II and highlights the "visible" turning point battles of the war in 1942 and 1943. By focusing not only on what happened but also on why, Alan Levine's novel approach to the subject questions whether the Axis ever had any hope of winning the war. As the Nazis conquered Poland in their march toward domination, the war began its inevitable spread across the world. Levine looks at the war from a geographical perspective, examining events on both the eastern and western fronts-such as the battles of Britain, the Atlantic, Stalingrad, and Midway-to determine how operations in these areas affected its overall path. Levine also scrutinizes key events that began to turn the war's outcome in favor of the Allies. These decisive moments include the entry of the United States into the war and the defeat of the German thrust to the vital Soviet oilfields of the Caucasus. From Axis Victories to the Turn of the Tide encompasses several critical years of world history and offers a fresh perspective for both general readers and academics interested in crucial events of World War II. Levine's analysis shows us how these seminal events shaped the world that we live in today. In War In History, Jeremy Black of the University of Exeter, descibes this book as"an interesting study that will be particularly useful for students." On the author Black says, "Levine, who teaches at the Borough of Manhattan Community College and has published a number of books on the war, concludes that the chances of a complete Axis triumph were probably non-existent. He argues that portraying the conflict as a series of narrow escapes from total disaster makes it more interesting, but is a conclusion that is weakened by the poor quality of Axis leadership and planning. Levine argues that the 1943 crisis did not endanger Britain's survival but rather the Allies' ability to sustain offensives. He suggests that this ability was a product of the Allies' taking risks with their supply lines and provision of aircraft."