Innovative Isds Regulations in CETA : To what extent can a 'two-level game' approach explain their accomplishment?

Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Globalization, Political Economics, grade: 15,5/20 ("sehr gut"), College of Europe, course: The EU in a Global Pplitical Economy Context, language: English, abstract: This essay uses Putnam's two-level game approach to analyse why CETA was firstly endangered but did eventually not fail because of the dispute on ISDS. I argue that this can be mainly explained by the overlapping of the win-sets, decisively rendered possible by the change of government in Canada. In this essay, I will first of all evaluate the win-sets of both parties. Secondly, I will analyse how and why these win-sets did at first not overlap but eventually did, before concluding with an estimation of the usefulness of Putnam's two-level game theory for European trade policy.